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Over the l a s t  two centuries, among those groups who have formed part of the ruling 
class of South Africa ( l ) ,  the "gentry" have been continually represented. By 
"gentry" I mean the relatively prosperous, market-oriented farm owner-operators, 
almost invariably white and i n  general considerable employers of labour. By the 
mid-twentieth century they came to own and control the vast majority of South Africa's 
agricultural land outside the African "reserves". (2) For instance, they were the 
"maize" whose uneasy union with "gold" was a t  the heart of South African capitalism 
i n  the early part of th is  century (3), and when they f e l l  out, i n  the 1940s, i t  was 
maize's defection to the National Party (significantly very largely on issues of 
labour control) that did much to bring that party into power. (4) This was possible 
i n  part because of the heavy weighting i n  favour of agricultural interests inherent 
i n  the Act of Union (5), i n  i t s e l f  a clear index of the power the gentry had been 
able to maintain even af ter  the growth of mining power and of industrial capital. 
Before then, the governments i n  all the future provinces of South Africa had been 
based on and had represented the gentry, to a greater or lesser degree. They were 
the core of the Afrikaner Bond, which grew out of the Boeren vereeniffimn and 
without whose support an administration could not be formed i n  the l a t e  nineteenth 
century Cape parliament. ( 6 )  Even earl ier ,  before the formation of the Bond as a 
true party, the commercial farmers were i n  general dominant within the parliament, 
much more so than more vaunted Cape l iberals ,  who, relying on the African small- 
holders of the east and on the merchant groups who serviced them, may have been 
strong enough to block but never to create. (7) It i s  symptomatic that the f i r s t  
measure of any consequence passed by the Cape parliament af ter  i t s  inauguration i n  
1854 was a very harsh Masters and Servants Act. The slave-holders who, i n  1831, had 
offered to barter the emancipation of their  slaves (albeit i n  rather diluted form) 
for  a representative assembly, had hown what they were doing. (8) A theoretically 
non-racial franchise notwithstanding, their  descendants still ran the Cape, and 
controlled their  labourers. 
The same was true of the other future provinces of the Union of South 
Africa, although the dominance of the gentry w a s  less  clear-cut. In  Natal, the 
relations between the gentry and the traders, transport riders and land speculators 
might a t  times be strained, but it was not unt i l  af ter  around 1900 that they were 
able to put the f u l l  squeeze on the African peasantries who lived, for instance, on 
the lands of the Natal Land and Colonization Company. (9) Nevertheless, much 
earlier, they had been able to compensate for th is  by arranging for  the immigration 
of large numbers of Indian indentured labourers to work, above all, i n  the 
plantations. In the b e  State, the wool farmers of the south clearly operated i n  
the same way as their  fellows across the Orange River, especially a f te r  they had 
managed to  winJde the Griquas out of the country round Philippolis. (10) Further 
north, matters were by no means so obvious. According to  Keegan, "by the 1880s and 
especially the 1890s, capi tal  and commerce were already making the i r  impact f e l t  on 
the class  structure of the countryside", but th i s  analysis suggests that  i t  was not 
u n t i l  the Lands Act of 1913 that  the restructuring was complete. (11) Even i n  the 
Transvaal, the notables were behaving much as  the gentry to the South well before 
Union (12), and afterwards developed in to  the most prominent agricultural capi ta l i s t s  
of the country, as the "maize triangle" dominated the countryside of the southern 
Transvaal. 
The emergence of the'gentry i n  any particular region of southern Africa can 
be dated to  the that  moment when the class  relat ions i n  the countryside are 
restructured so as to  enable the production of cash crops on a f a i r ly  extensive scale 
under the immediate control of the landowner (or  perhaps his representative). This 
i s  i n  contradistinction t o  two other methods of exploiting the te r r i tory  that  the 
whites had conquered from the Africans. F i rs t ,  there was the possibi l i ty  that  the 
whites would themselves indulge i n  what was effectively subsistence agriculture and 
pastoralism only peripherally bound t o  the market. This was a matter of circumstance 
rather  than choice, a f ac t  which probably led  t o  the harsh exploitation of the i r  
mainly Khoisan labourers. (13) The second mode of exploitation was based on the 
extraction of surplus from African peasants. This was particularly the case i n  the 
northern provinces, rather  than the Cape, where free smallholders were f a r  more 
commonly found. Indeed, the merchants who took up a l ibera l  stance opposed to  that  
of the gentry were largely those whose business in teres t  t ied them to the African 
smallholders, above all i n  the Ciskei. (14) 
The s h i f t  to  the more "capital is t"  forms of agriculture did not necessarily 
coincide with the development of a rural proletar iat ,  i f  by this exclusively wage 
labourers are meant. Various forms of labour tenancy certainly post-dated the 
emergence of the gentry. Slavery, too, could exis t  with capi ta l i s t  farming as I have 
defined it,  perhaps i n  the inboekselinwn system of the Afrikaner republics (15), and 
certainly i n  the classic  colonial form of the Cape before 1834. Although a certain 
amount of readjustment was needed, there i s  nothing to suggest that  there was a major 
restructuring of class  relat ions a f t e r  emancipation. (16) A s  I w i l l  be arguing below, 
by then the pre-eminence of the gentry within Cape society had been established. Only 
with the industrialization of South Africa was this system challenged, and even then 
the gentry were able to  maintain the i r  power i n  the countryside. To t h i s  day, fo r  
instance, there i s  no sign of an agricultural workers' trade union i n  South Africa. 
Clearly, the gentry i n  other parts  of South Africa (with the pa r t i a l  
exception of Natal) derive from tha t  of the Cape Colony and, i n i t i a l l y ,  of i t s  old core 
area, the south-west Cape. Very often, r ich  farmers i n  the Eastern Cape and the Free 
State,  f o r  instance, were l inea l  descendants of Swartland or  Boland gentry who were 
able to  buy in to  sheep farms, most probably as  a resul t  of greater reserves of capital,  
o r  credit-worthiness. It would therefore seem necessary to  determine when the gentry 
were able t o  achieve something approaching hegemony within the Cape Colony. 
There would seem to  be two inter-related but distinguishable aspects of th i s  
question. One is  loosely pol i t ica l ,  referr ing to the date a t  which the gentry came to 
achieve a relat ively high degree of influence over the lower organs of government, 
part icular ly i n  the countryside, and were able to  transmit some of the power so gained 
through to  the central government, over whose decision-making processes they gained 
considerable influence, i f  not d i rec t  power. This i s  a process which it is  d i f f i cu l t  
to  date with any precision. Clearly, i t  long pre-dated the establishment of 
Par1iamenta.q assemblies and government ( i n  1854 and 1872, respectively) , even though 
the establishment of these ins t i tu t ions  was long a goal of the gentry (though the i r  
enthusiasm was perhaps somewhat tempered by the fear,  ultimately unwarranted, that they 
would be dominated by the English-speaking cape). On the other hand, i t  i s  not 
just i f ied t o  push the process back too close to the foundation of the colony. In  th i s  
context i t  i s  important to  make a dis t inct ion between the degree of power which a faxm 
owner had over h i s  labourers, which was clearly very considerable as  long a s  they 
remained slaves - and long a f t e r  - and what which the slave-owning group had with 
respect to  the central government, which was probably l e s s  than i n  any other 
contemporary slave-owning colony. (17) There i s  no indication that  the power of the 
Dutch East India Company (VOC) was i n  any way diminished, o r  indeed seriously 
threatened, a t  the Cape u n t i l  well in to  the eighteenth century, once it had ridden 
out the storms consequent on the dismissal of Willem Adriaan van der Stel.  (18) 
Only with the Pat r io t  movement of the 1780s were,the gentry able t o  challenge the 
control of the Company o f f i c i a l s  who had ruled the Cape f o r  over a hundred yeass, 
and only with the f a l l  of the Dutch East India Company and the conquest of the Cape 
by the Br i t i sh  did they become fu l ly  equal partners i n  the running of the Cape 
Colony. 
It should be stressed that  th i s  periodization i s  somewhat hypothetical, a s  
i s  no doubt inevitable with such a loose concept as hegemony or  even control. 
Nevertheless. there i s  considerable circumstantial evidence tha t  such a s h i f t  did 
take place. F i rs t ,  the government o f f i c i a l s  were increasingly drawn from the rura l  I 
farming community, and remained fu l ly  receptive to i t s  wishes. For the major period I 
of VOC rule  t h i s  was not the case. Company off ic ia ls  were i n  theory not allowed to  1 
own farms and, while undoubtedly some of them continued t o  do so even a f t e r  Willem 
Adriaan van der S te l  and his cl ientele  had been forced to  s e l l  up, they could do so 
only by subterfuge. (19) Under the Bri t ish,  i n  contrast, the Fiscaal, the leading 
law off icer  of the colony, was one of the Cape's r ichest  f a r m e n  Equally 
significantly, Cape officialdom ceased to  be a closed group, recrui t ing i t s  new 
members from Europe but not from outside i t s  own network a t  the Cape. In  1779, fo r  
instance, of the 94 o f f i c i a l s  employed i n  the central administration a t  Cape Town, 
48 had been born a t  the Cape, but they were a l l  the sons of former VOC off icials .  (21) 
The contrast with the period some twenty-five years l a t e r ,  as  described by Freund, 
is  striking. I n  his view, which seems thoroughly just i f ied,  although he incorrectly 
projects i t  too fas back in to  the past,  the Cape Town o f f i c i a l s  "were not a d is t inc t  
economic class" but "blended naturally in to  the wealthy farming families of the 
western Cape". By the f i r s t  decade of the century there were r i ch  families - he 
names the Van Reenens and the Cloetes - i n  which "some members were farmers while 
others were officials1' ,  and many of the other r ichest  members of the gentry were 
connected by various marriage alliances to  these off icials .  The o f f i c i a l s  
functioned as the po l i t i ca l  l i nk  between the government and the white farming 
community, since they tended to  remain i n  office no matter which newly arrived 
European group was i n  power. Thus not only did they provide a degree of continuity 
across the troubled period when the vicissitudes of w a r  gave the Cape four different 
governments within a decade and a half ,  but also they were able t o  incorporate the 
newcomers, whether Br i t i sh  o r  Batavian, t o  the gentry i n  a way which would have been 
abhorrent f o r  the o f f i c i a l s  of the VOC i n  the mid-eighteenth century. (22) 
What was t rue f o r  the central administration was even more the case fo r  
the d i s t r i c t  administrations. I n  the l a s t  years of the eighteenth century the 
heemraden and d i s t r i c t  administrations i n  general substantially increased the i r  power 
vis-L-vis the central  government, gaining the r ight  t o  handle f a r  more substantial 
court cases than hithsrto. (23) A t  the same time they maintained the i r  grasp on 
the distribution of land, such an important counter i n  the system of control on the 
South African countryside. (24) This power, moreover, was cleasly i n  the hands of 
the r ichest  farmers within the d i s t r i c t s ,  who formed the rural e l i t e  i n  each of the 
d i s t r i c t s  and monopolized the positions of authority within the c i v i l  - and indeed 
military and ecclesiast ical  - administration. The landdrost had re la t ive ly  l i t t l e  
freedom of action should he wish t o  work against these dominant local  notables, but 
normally and increasingly the appointed magistrates and the gentry accommodated each 
other's in teres ts  f o r  the control and prosperity of the countryside. A s  Freund put 
it: 
The landdrost administered from a weak position and the 
most successful landdrosten, such a s  Fame and Van der 
Riet, although sometimes able t o  d n t a i n  an independent 
point of view, had to  know very well how to  accommodate 
loca l  interests .  (25) 
It would be a gross exaggeration to  suggest tha t  these processes 
represented a capture of the s t a t e  by the gentry. Particularrly a colonial 
administration, responsible t o  and taking orders from Amsterdam o r  London, could not 
allow i t s e l f  t o  become subservient t o  one part icular  in teres t  group within the colony, 
be i t  ewer so crucial f o r  pol i t ica l  control and economic prosperity. Rather, the 
interpenetration of gentry and of f ic ia l  groups gave the r ich  farmers much of what 
they needed a t  the local  level ,  i n  terms of control over labour, over land and over 
public works. This did not en ta i l  that  the econohic measures promulgated from Cape 
Town or  London with regard, for  instance, to customs duties, were always to  the i r  
l iking,  nor did it mean tha t  there were not various efforts  inspired by the 
philanthropic movements within and outside South Africa to  change the nature of the 
relationship between the gentry and the i r  labourers. Nevertheless, the degree of 
gentry power where i t  rea l ly  mattered, i n  the d i s t r i c t s  of Stellenbosch, Erakenstein, 
Tulbagh o r  Swellendam, meant that  these ef for ts  would without d i f f icu l ty  be turned 
from the i r  intended path. 
This s h i f t  i n  the power relat ions within the Cape Colony was t o  a certain 
l extent signalled by the outbreak of the Patr iot  movement around 1780. A s  w i l l  be 
l 
argued l a t e r  i n  th i s  paper, the ideology of th i s  movement was i n  great par t  a 
ref lect ion of the in teres ts  of the gentry, and it  found i ts  greatest support i n  the 
country d i s t r i c t s  of the south-west Cape. I n  a sense, indeed, the very f ac t  of the 
movement shows how f a r  power relat ions had shifted. Earl ier  i n  the century, such a 
I challenge t o  the authorities of the VOC, by a very high proportion of the most 
I important i n  the colony, would have been inconceivable. 
1 
A s  always i n  h is tor ica l  explanation, the f i r s t  v i t a l  question i n  the 
I explanation of this sh i f t ,  i f  i t  i s  admitted that  i t  occurred a t  a part icular  moment, 
i s  t o  explain why it  was a t  just  that  time that  i t  occurred. I n  this case, i t  i s  
cleax that  the most important s tructural  cause was a changed balance of economic clout 
I between the gentry and the Dutch East India Company. It would, of course, be too 
economistic to  ascribe th i s  transformation ent irely to  the combination of an 
I increasingly unprofitable and financially weakened VOC and the cumulative effects  of 
the increasing prosperity of the Cape farming c o m i t y .  Nevertheless, i t  i s  clear  
that  without th i s  combination of circumstances the struggle f o r  gentry participation 
l i n  the running of the colony would have taken an ent irely different  form, i f  it had 
, 
l occurred a t  all. The VOC, as  an ins t i tu t ion ,  had l o s t  confidence; the gentry, a s  a class,  had gained it, and indeed f o r  the f i r s t  time were able t o  see themselves as a 
d is t inc t  and powerful group. . 
The decline i n  the fortunes of the Dutch East India Company can be clearly 
l seen from the basic figures of i ts income and expenditure. Until 1780 there was never 
l a decade i n  which the revenue i t  received from the sale  of i ts products i n  Europe w a s  
l e s s  than the t o t a l  cost of i t s  equipage, which represented v i r t u d l y  al l  i ts costs, 
including the financing of i t s  running losses within Asia. Thereafter, i n  contrast, 
whereas i ts expenditure over the period 1780-1795 was f 299 million, i ts income was no 
more than f 207 million. In other words, the former exceeded the l a t t e r  by 44 per 
cent. (26) Moreover, the Cape was, as  it had always been, one of the significant 
contributors to  the tota3. def ic i t ,  making a los s  of over f 300,000 a year. Throughout 
I the 1780s major e f for ts  were made t o  reduce this sum, but largely without resul t .  (27) 
The combination of the long-term ossif icat ion of the Company's decision structures, 
the costs of t e r r i t o r i a l  ru le  i n  the East and the increasing competition from English, 
Danish and Chinese merchants, with the shocks of the fourth Anglo-Dutch w a r  (1780-84), 
had driven the VOC t o  the point of bankruptcy (28), so that  the old cer ta in t ies  on the 
relationship between the company and its subjects could no longer hold. 
While the impending f a l l  of the VOC has been a well recognized feature of 
l l a t e  eighteenth century history (29), it has not been usual f o r  his torians t o  take the 
" r i se  of the gentry" as  a main theme f o r  the history of the Cape countryside during 
tha t  period. To do so requires a major revision of the accepted, or  a t  l e a s t  
t radi t ional ,  view of the Cape economy under the VOC. It i s  more normal to  see the 
farmers of the wheat and wine d i s t r i c t s  of the south-west Cape as  debt-ridden, 
ineff icient  operators, only able to  make a reasonable l iv ing  i f  they could get the i r  
hands on one of the exceedingly lucrat ive revenue leases f o r  the sale  of wine o r  meat. 
They suffered from the creeping disease known as  "overproduction1', so that ,  f a r  too 
often, t he i r  wine had t o  be poured away down the r ivers  and the i r  wheat l e f t  to  r o t  i n  
the barns, because the price i t  would fetch i n  Cape Town would not cover the cost of 
transporting i t  there. The dynamic sector of the Cape economy was i n  the in ter ior ,  
among the trekboers. Even that was not over-dynamic, since the advantages of th i s  
way of l i f e  are seen to  l i e  i n  the rewards of subsistence farming and stock-raising 
i n  providing a higher standard of l iv ing  f o r  the same investment, and not i n  the 
cash rewards tha t  could be gained from running ca t t l e  and sheep on the Karroo, the 
Camdeboo o r  the Zuurveld. (30) 
Clearly, to  challenge th i s  view requires a full-scale reinterpretation 
of the Cape economy i n  terms of i t s  relat ion to  the world economy as  represented by 
what was s t i l l  one of the two premier capi ta l i s t  organizations of the time, the 
Dutch East India Company. This i s  not the place to  do that  i n  de ta i l ,  especially 
as  the f u l l  analysis requires the lengthy exposition of trustworthy (and other) 
s t a t i s t i c s .  The basic points must be summarized, however. (31) 
F i r s t ,  a t  l e a s t  from the middle of the eighteenth century, the agricultural 
sector of the Cape economy continuously expanded. To take the simplest measure of 
this expansion, the production of wine and - although to  demonstrate th i s  requires 
considerable ingenuity, with decreasingly rel iable s t a t i s t i c s  - grain increased 
without ha l t  ,as indeed did the colony1 S holdings of stock.  his point, though, i s  
of l e s s  immediate relevance to  the present argument.) For instance, i n  1720 there 
were rather  over two million vines i n  the colony, i n  1750 just under four million, 
and i n  1790 about nine and a half million. Considering there i s  also evidence that  
the productivity of the vines also increased during the century, the increase i n  
wine production can be seen to be very considerable, A s  regards wheat, corrected 
figures f o r  production, which take into account the fa,rmerrsl growing unwillingness 
to  declare the i r  harvest correctly, show that  around 1720 about eighteen thousand 
m i d  wheat were harvested a year, around 1750 th i r ty  thousand, and around 1790 over 
-
f i f  ty-five thousand. (32) This growth naturally occasionally produced gluts,  since 
the market was of a f i n i t e  s ize,  even though grain i n  part icular  was exported i n  f a i r  
quantities to  the east  and to  Europe from the middle of the century. Nevertheless, 
these gluts  were f a r  r a re r  than i s  generally envisaged, and, when there was a sudden 
increase i n  demand, with the axrival of a large foreign f l e e t  o r  the stationing of 
an increased garrison i n  time of w a r ,  f o r  instance, grain was frequently i n  short 
supply. (33) On one occasion, a million pounds of wheat had t o  be imported from 
the United States  to  cover a threatening shortfall .  (34) I n  the short term, 
perfect ar t iculat ion of supply and demand i s  evidently impossible with such products, 
which are subject to  the vagaxies of the weather and f o r  which reduction decisions 
have t o  be made well i n  advance of the moment of marketing. (357 I n  the not all too 
long term, i n  contrast,  the evidence would seem to  suggest that  the necessary 
adjustments of supply and demand were made with relat ively great efficiency. 
In a sense, the very f ac t  of agricultural expansion i s  evidence f o r  this .  
Even i f  Leonard Guelke (36) is r ight  t o  suggest that the extent of expansion of the 
pastoral economy derived from the lack of an al ternat ive providing a reasonable 
level  of existence f o r  those with l i t t l e  capi tal ,  nevertheless suff icient  capi tal  
was cleazly bei generated within South Africa (37) t o  allow continual investment 
i n  ag r i cu l tu re .~38)  Naybe the prof i t s  so gained were not spectacular, and maybe, 
had i t  been possible t o  t ransfer  flmds out of Cape Colony with any ease, the degree 
of expansion would not have been so rapid, and the r a t e  of p ro f i t  within the country 
consequently higher. (39) A l l  the same, there was suff icient  money t o  be earned 
from wine and wheat f d n g  f o r  these two ac t iv i t i e s  t o  be seen, i n  the long term, 
as  worth expanding. 
Although farming was very largely able to  finance its own expansion, i t  
should be pointed out that  hard currency - foreign exchange as  it were - was 
necessary to  enable the planting of vineyards and the growing of greater acreages 
of wheat. I n  the f i r s t  place, tools, ploughs and other equipment had to  be 
imported, or,  i f  they were not, a t  l e a s t  the r a w  materials had t o  be, and then made 
up by the increasing number of ar t isans i n  Cape Town and the south-west Cape 
countryside. No iron o r  other metal was smelted i n  the Cape colony u n t i l  well in to  
the nineteenth century. Secondly, and more importantly, labour had t o  be imported. 
Even though the decline of the Khoisan population m a y  not have been a s  great a s  has 
previously been thought (40), it would be vain to  argue tha t  it actually grew during 
the eighteenth century. Of course, increasing numbers of Khoisan were imported in to  
the colonial labour process, but very many of these were forced to take service with 
the frontier trekboers. To a very large extent, the expansion of agricultural 
production for the Cape market was possible only because of the ready supply of 
slave labour. This had to be imported and paid for. The Cape slave population was 
in no sense self-reproducing, except perhaps in the last years of slavery. Rather, 
the indications are clear that, without the continual topping up of the slave trade, 
the slave population of the Cape would have declined, as indeed it did after 1807. 
In the eighteenth century, the salient features of the Cape slave population, in 
demographic terms, were the low fertility of the women, at least compared to that of 
the Cape whites, very possibly a high death rate (41), and, above all, a wild 
imbalance in the sex ratio. No group which had 405 men for every hundred women, as 
the burgher-owned Cape slaves did in 1749, could possibly remain constant over a 
long period without considerable immigration - in this case, of course, the forced 
immigration of the slave trade. 
Nevertheless, the slave population of the Ca e ew at an average rate of 
2.47 per cent per annum over the period 1720 to 1790. f42$ Moreover, the rate of 
growth was, if anything, higher in the latter part of the century. Over the period 
1764-8 to 1784-8, the annual rate of growth was 2.82 per cent per annum. This was 
not an exclusively urban phenomenon. Over the same period slave numbers in the 
agricultural districts of Stellenbosch and Drakenstein increased by 3.24 per cent 
per amawn. Clearly, the growing of grain and grapes allowed for continued 
investment in labour - by far the most important tlcomrnoditylt required in the 
production process of these goods - to step up the further growing of these crops. 
In the long term, despite the complaints of famers who, as always, considered 
themselves disadvantaged by government marketing and taxation policies, this growth 
is not consistent with a view of Cape agriculture that sees it recurrently glutting 
an insufficient market. Clearly, taken as a whole, the agricultural sector of the 
Cape economy was sufficiently prosperous and profitable to make continued investment 
and expansion viable and attractive. 
Further evidence for this growth in prosperity can be found in the physical 
structure of the Cape fasms. Only in the latter part of the eighteenth century was 
there any significant building in Cape farmhouses - or, rather, it was from this 
period that they were rebuilt with considerable luxury and at great expense. Those 
symbols of the South African gentry, the Cape Dutch farmhouses, date almost 
exclusively from the period 1770 to 1820. (43) With their complicated plaster-work 
and luxuriously timbered yellowwood ceilings, to say nothing of the M t u r e  they 
contain, these houses in themselves witness the fact that their owners, the wine 
fsulners of the south-west Cape, were doing well enough to create their own imitation 
of fiench chateaux, even if it was to be some time before their wine came to approach 
that of Europe. 
Visitors to the Cape around 1780 certainly described the life of these 
fsulners in glowing terms. S. P. van Braam wrote that he had seen "a magnificence 
which I am certain in general can be found in no other colony, nor even in the richest 
cities of any country in the world". (44) The Commissioner Hendrik Breton, who was 
at the Cape in 1783, wrote that he had seen unequalled prosperity at the Cape and 
that "on various farms, that I expressly visited, I found a far from simple life, and 
nothing except signs of prosperity, to the extent that, in addition to splendour and 
magnificence in clothes and carriages, the houses are filled with elegant furniture 
and the tables decked with silverware and served by tidily clothed slaves". This was 
possible, to a certain extent, because of the boom caused by the very war that did so 
much to reduce the Company to bankruptcy, but it was also a sign of the longpterm 
growth in wealth of the richer Cape farmers. (45) 
Neither Van Braam nor Breton was a fully impart2 al witness, it is true. 
Both were concerned to blacken the reputation of the Cape farmers and show how 
unreasonable the chages of the Cape patriots were. Nevertheless, that does not 
make their testimony valueless, especially as the Patriots themselves, probably the 
originators of the overproduction myth of the eighteenth century Cape economy, did 
not present any convincing evidence of their plight. In their petition of 1779 - 
before, it should be noted, the outbreak of the war that was so valuable to the Cape - 
they gave as an example of the problems caused by the Cape marketing system the glut 
of 1757. (46) It i s  reasonable to assume that, had there been a similar c r i s i s  year 
since then, they would have brought i t  t o  the notice of the Heren XVII. A disease 
which had not returned for twenty-two years can scarcely be thought endemic. 
Naturally this new prosperity was not spread evenly throughout the colony. In  
order to benefit from it, a man or woman needed a fa i r ly  considerable i n i t i a l  base. It 
was generally the well established farmers who were able to expand their  operations. 
While clear prodf of th is  i s  as yet lacking, it can be shown that the same families 
remained active as wine farmers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Various surnames recur with great regularity i n  a l l  the opgaaf l i s t s .  Of the 53 
families (47) i n  which a t  leas t  one member owned 10,000 or more vines i n  1731 i n  
Stellenbosch and Drakenstein dis t r ic ts ,  29 s t i l l  did i n  1752, 22 i n  1782 and as many 
as 19 i n  1825. (48) Of the 70 families which ful f i l led  the same condition i n  1752, 
38 were s t i l l  present i n  1782 and 30 around 1825; of the 83 i n  1782, 55 could s t i l l  
be found 43 years later .  Moreover, the surviving families were i n  general among the 
most significant. In  1825 (49), the 19 families which had been present i n  every year 
since 1731, which were investigated, had between them 41 per cent of the total  vines 
i n  the colony and formed 43 per cent of al l  those farmers who had 20,000 or more vines. 
It is  very di f f icul t  to know precisely how much weight should be put on 
these figures, especially as there seem to be no standard tables with which they can 
be compared and the continual expansion of wine farming allowed families to maintain 
themselves i n  ways that would have been impossible i n  a contracting industry. On the 
other hand, prima facie they would seem to be a strong argument for a relatively high 
degree of continuity within the most important sector of Cape agriculture. The 
circulation of the Cape farming e l i t e  cannot have been as rapid as has sometimes (50) 
been claimed. 
In part because of th is  continuity within the various leading gentry 
families, the division of wealth within the gentry did not become extreme. This can 
best be measured i n  terms of slave holdings, since .slaves were a t  once the best index 
of a farmer's productive capacity, an important luxury,@ a symbol of wealth. Only one 
farmer i n  the history of the colony, so f a r  as I know, admitted to having more than 
one hundred slaves. This was Martin Melck, who had eleven farms and was also the 
lessee of the Cape wine franchise for many years. (51) But Melck, the Cloetes of 
Constantia and their  fellow plutocrats remained very exceptional within the Cape 
context, perhaps as a result  of partible Roman-Dutch inheritance law which mitigated 
against the maintenance of large es-tates over the generations. Rather, as i s  shown 
i n  Table I, which gives slave-holding figures for the two major agricultural d is t r ic ts ,  
there was a clear tendency for the numbers of middle-level farmers to increase 
throughout the eighteenth century, both i n  absolute terms and as a proportion of the 
total  number of slave owners. The Cape gentry consisted of a relatively 
undifferentiated broad mass of farmers, rather than a small e l i t e  with whom it would 
have been f a r  easier for the VOC to do deals. There was, of course, a small group of 
very rich contractors, particularly for  the wine and meat franchises, but thei r  
influence became less  as the century wore on, as they became submerged i n  the growing 
t ide of substantial, but not exceptionally rich, farmers. In  South Africa, as 
elsewhere, the "r ise  of the gentry" also entailed If the decline of the aristocracy". 
On the other hand, i t  i s  clear that a t  a very local level the substantial 
farmers formed a cohesive and dominant group. The most extreme example of th is  i s  
undoubtedly the immediate neighbourhood of S tellenbosch. Around 1806, for  instance, 
478 of the 628 slaves i n  and around the village were owned by no more than eleven 
households out of a to ta l  white population of 330. It was this s m a l l  group which 
claimed for i t s e l f  the positions of heemraden, church deacons, officers i n  the militia, 
and so forth. (52) It should be noted that very local groupings cannot be easily 
identified ear l ier  i n  the colony's history - without major effort  that i s  now slowly 
proceeding - because the eighteenth century opmaf ro l l s  do not give place of residence 
except i n  terms of the exceedingly large distr icts .  Equivalent cliques, though not as 
powerf'ul or wealthy, were to be found throughout the Boland and the Swartland. It was 
the conglomerate of these groups, which merged into the richer stock-breeders of, for 
instance, the Bokkeveld or Swellendam, that made up the Cape gentry. 
It is against this background that the Cape Patriot movement of the 1780s 
and 1790s developed. It would, of course, be vain to suggest that the movement 
itself was purely the result of the economic changes that occurred during the latter 
decades of the century. On the one hand, the immediate trigger for the explosion of 
political feeling was the high-handed action of the Fiscaal against one particular 
Burgher, Care1 Hendrik Buitendag.(53) On the other hand, overseas events did much to 
impel the Kapenaars into action. 
The revolt of the thirteen colonies on the North American coast may have 
served as an example for both the Netherlands and its dependencies (54), while from 
1781 on the Patriots at the Cape were able to gain sustenance from those Dutch 
politicians and populists who were challenging the authority of the Prince of 
Orange. (55) As opuerbewindhebber (chief director) of the VOC, the Prince was as 
much the target of the Cape action as of that in the Netherlands, and various Dutch 
patriots were greatly concerned with the problems of the Dutch colonial empire and its 
ruling companies. (56) Nevertheless, as it developed, the Cape Patriot movement 
became increasingly concerned with the local interests of the Colony as they affected 
the gentry. The initial pamphlets spread around Cape Town in 1778 might have derived 
their arguments from the ideas of the enlightenment and in particular from the anti- 
Orangist strain within Dutch political thought. Once the movement got organized, 
however,' politics drew their inspiration, as always, from the major issues of local 
society, in particular the division of wealth. 
This orientation is pasticularly clear in the Burgher memorial of 1779, 
which was drawn up by four representatives of the Cape Burghers, Jacobus van Reenen, 
Barend Jacob Artoys, Tielman Roos and Nicholaas Godfried Heyns. These four men, who 
were to present the memorial to the Heren XVII in Holland, had been chosen by the 
three Burgerraden of Cape Town and the four Heemraden of Stellenbosch and Drakenstein 
as the representatives of 404 other burghers who, presumably, subscribed to its 
tenets. It can thus be taken as representing the views of a large proportion of Cape 
burghers. Somewhat over 15 per cent of the Cape's free adult males (excluding those 
in service of the VOC and the Khoisan) associated themselves with it. (57) 
After a somewhat unconvincing attempt to portray the Cape economy as being 
in desperate straits, the memorial consisted of two parts, a vehement attack on the 
activities of various Company officials and a list of suggestions for the better 
organization of the colony. The main charges against the officials were two-fold. 
On the one hand were attacks upon the stakes of the burghers. Particularly, the 
Fiscal, Mr W. C. Boers, and the secretary of the Council of Policy, 0. M. Bergh, were 
accused of standing upon their own dignity to an unwarranted extent and of meting 
out summary and unjustified punishments to burghers for piffling offences. Implicit 
in these charges is a claim by the burghers to treatment equivalent with the Company 
officials. In a muted fashion they were attacking the hierarchical system of the 
colony and demanding a position of equivalence for themselves. No longer would they 
acquiesce in being dutifil subordinates to the remnten of the VOC. 
More important were the burghers' attacks on the corruption and peculation 
of the officials. Throughout the colony's history there had been complaints that 
members of the government disobeyed the Heren XVII's prohibition against private trade 
and the ownership of land and that the perquisites that the officials engrossed were 
exhorbitantly high. (58) mether matters got worse during the 1770s is debatable. 
Theal, for instance, claimed that Ryk Tulbagh, the governor who had died in 1771, "had 
kept a watchfil eye on every official, and allowed no one to overstep the directions 
concerning farming and trading, or to take afee that he was not entitled to". Van 
Plettenberg, who succeeded him, in contrast is said to have "permitted his subordinates 
to do almost as they chose. The result was a condition of affairs in which no 
transaction with government could be caxried out without bribery, in which many of the 
officials farmed and traded openly and the colonists generally became discontentedt1.(59) 
Nevertheless, Tulbagh himself died an exceedingly wealthy man, which could in no way 
have been derived in any large measure from his sala,ry. (60) Perhaps matters had got 
laxer under Van Plettenberg. Certainly they had got more organized. There were no 
longer any complaints, as there had been seventy years earlier, that the officials 
were monopolizing production and out-fanning the settlers. The middle-sized wine and 
wheat farms of the south-west Cape were by now f a r  too ef f ic ient  and well established 
fo r  that  t o  have been feasible. Rather, the major complaints that  were made were 
against the two trading firms, Cruywagen and Kie and Le Febre and Kie, which both 
had several high o f f i c i a l s  among the partners and which dominated the import trade, 
making large prof i t s  a s  a resul t  of the i r  oligopolist  position. To a certain extent 
these attacks came from those of the Pat r io ts  who were themselves Cape Town merchants, 
as  the Pat r io t  movement was never an exclusively gentry phenomenon. (61) Against 
this, the farmers realized that  the two firms kept the prices f o r  the imported goods 
they were increasingly buying a t  a higher level  than would have been the case given 
a l iberal izat ion of trade. A t  that  level,  the in teres ts  of the gentry and the Cape 
merchants coincided, while a t  the same time the buoyant agricultural class  was 
attempting to  control i t s  own marketing. 
The same coincidence of in teres t  can be seen i n  the demands that  the 
Pat r io ts  made f o r  the reorganization of the colony. Several of the clauses related 
to matters exclusively affecting the Capetonians. These included complaints about 
i l l ega l  trading by small stall-holders on the beach of Table Bay and by the various 
Chinese and Javanese exi les  who had been banned to  the Cape and were said to  be 
behind much slave theft .  Others were of more general nature, such as the various 
measures to  reduce the arbi trar iness of Cape justice and generally to cheapen it. 
The demands fo r  f ree  trade and f o r  the r ight  of Kapenaars to  run the i r  own ships to  
the East and to  Holland would also benefit  both townsmen and farmers, especially as 
these ships would largely export agricultural products and import slave labour, 
which, since i t  was intended to  trade with Madagascar and Zanzibar, would largely be 
used i n  the countryside. (62) I n  th i s  class  of demand, the most important was that  
the Burghers might be allowed to  punish the i r  own slaves "without being allowed to 
tyrannise them", that  the costs of chaining or  gaoling a slave might be reduced. 
The monopoly of the legal  use of force, even inf l ic ted  by a master on his own slave, 
had long been one of the bulwarks of Company rule. (63) I n  challenging it, the 
burghers were making a very r ea l  claim fo r  CO-dominance i n  the most v i t a l  aspect of 
colonial society, i t s  labour relations. 
More clearly t o  the advantage of the gentry were demands that  the Company 
be driven out of i t s  hinge position i n  the buying of g a i n  and wine, especially that  
destined f o r  export. I n  this way the gentry hoped to  be able to  force up the price 
of these two products since the VOC always tended t o  derive the maximum prof i t s  from 
these goods by f ixing the prices a t  the lowest practicable level. A t  the same time 
the rationalization of the land policy of the Cape which the memorial proposed could 
only have led  to  even more land being engrossed by the wealthier farmers of the Cape. 
One notable absence from this memorial i s  any mention whatsoever of the 
meat market o r  the p&, much hated by the in t e r io r  stock farmers. (64) This was 
because there were few, i f  any, of the in t e r io r  farmers represented i n  the Patr iot  
movement. Their po l i t i ca l  upsurge would take a different,  more violent and i n  some 
ways more radical course i n  the 1790s. (65) Moreover, one of the burgher 
representatives who composed the memorial, Jacobus van Reenen, had himself made a 
fortune as  meat p w t e r ,  and his son now held that  lucrat ive contract. (66) The 
Pat r io ts  were always cool-headed enough not to attack the i r  own interests .  
That these opinions were general throughout the Cape f d n g  population 
can be seen from a request tha t  was submitted t o  the Council of Policy i n  February 
1784 by 14 of the most substantial Cape farmers. (67) They had always maintained 
the i r  distance from the Patr iots ,  probably because they f e l t  the need t o  keep the i r  
l i nes  of connnunication open t o  a government which could sti l l  dispose of many favours. 
Their memorial was thus free of the acerbity of the Patr iots '  demands, while i n  any 
case gentry opinions had by this stage been somewhat tempered by the economic boom 
of the early 1780s. Nevertheless, the signatories of the 1784 memorial (68), trying 
t o  protect themselves against the ef fec ts  of the slump they expected t o  follow the 
ending of the War, made economic demands tha t  were very largely simila2to those of 
the Patr iots ,  although they were f a r  more concerned to  s t ress  the poverty i n  which 
the stock boers of the in t e r io r  lived. The constitution that  was suitable when the 
Cape was no more than a refreshment s ta t ion  would no longer serve, they believed, so 
that  overseas trade among the burghers now had t o  be allowed. 
The other demands of the Patriots were largely political, as they demanded 
far greater responsibilities for the Burgher Raad, and that that body be made 
elective. As such, they were not shared by the more conciliatory 1784 signatories. 
Nor were they met. De Mist had plans to allow elections to the consultative bodies 
he set up in 1804, but these were quietly dropped and the high Tory governors of the 
Cape from 1806 on were glad to retain the appointments to consultative organs in 
their own hands. (69) Only in 1836 were there elective micipal boards and in 1854 
a representative assembly in which gentry were f'ully represented. 
This assembly replaced a Legislative Council in which the unofficial 
majority was selected by the Governor "out of the chief landed proprietors and 
principal merchants of the colony". (70) In a sense this symbolized the new 
alliance that ran the Cape after 1800. Once its rulers had ceased to be merchants 
themselves, and to use the powers of office to ensure their own and their Company's 
advantage, the mercantile elite saw that their own prosperity depended in large 
measure on the well being of agricultural capital and there was no sign of major 
conflict between the producers and the distributors. (71) Both farmers and traders 
became shareholders in the Cape country banks, set up after 1836. (72) Moreover, the 
government itself had every interest in supporting the wine producers. In 1825 Lord 
Charles Somerset, as authoritarian a governor as any in the Cape's history, was 
prepared to inaugurate a Select Committee for the improvement of Cape wines and to 
chair the inaugural meeting. (73) Moreover, except for those measures that were 
forced on them from London, the Cape government did nothing to disturb the pattern 
of labour relations that had been established so advantageously for the Cape gentry. 
The Commissioners of Enquiry were surely right when they wrote, in 1826, that "there 
is nothing in the character or in the general conduct of the body of the people of 
this colony that implies a spirit of disaffection to the government1'. (74) Informal, 
tacit bargains had been struck which meant that the Cape government accepted the 
influence of the Cape gentry. Later this was transformed into the formal CO- 
dominance that has lasted, more or less, ever since. 
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Table I. Slave holding - 
1 - 9  
N % 
1731 42 64.5 
174 1 44 62.0 
1752 6 3 68.5 
1761 6 1 65.6 
1773 7 1 65.7 
1782 9 1 65.9 
Ste l lenbosch  
10 - 19 
N % 
11 16.9 
20 + Tota l .  
---- -- - 
N % 
12 18.5 65 
13 18.3 71 
11 12.0 92 
13 14.0 93 
13 12.0 108 
13 12.0 138 
Drakenstein 
1731 133 81.6 2 2 13.5 8 4.9 163 
174 1 170 81 .O 3 1 14.8 9 4.3 210 
1752 167 82.3 9 14.3 7 3.4 203 
1761 228 80.3 43 15.1 13 4.5 284 
1773 26 3 74.3 75 21.2 16 4.5 354 
1782 3 16 68.4 110 23.8 36 7.8 462 
Source: Worden "The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of s l a v e s  i n  t h e  Cape Colony dur ing  t h e  Eighteenth 
Century ' ,  Unpublished paper 1979. 
N.B. U n t i l  1752 Swellendam was included under Drakestein.  
